When  No  Is Not Enough: The Express Rejection of Sexual Advances under Title VII by Watral, Diana M.
When "No" Is Not Enough: The Express Rejection of
Sexual Advances under Title VII
Diana M. Watralt
INTRODUCTION
The antiretaliation provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964' provides that it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate
against an employee after the employee opposes a practice that is un-
lawful under Title VII.' To establish a retaliation claim under Title VII's
opposition clause, the employee must prove that: (1) she engaged in
statutorily protected activity; (2) she suffered an adverse employment
action; and (3) the protected activity was the but-for cause of the ad-
verse action.! Recently, a circuit split has developed over whether reject-
ing a supervisor's sexual advances constitutes "protected activity" suffi-
cient to establish an actionable retaliation claim. This Comment seeks
to determine whether an employee engages in protected activity when
"expressly rejecting" her supervisor's sexual advances-that is, by simp-
ly stating "no" in response to the advances.
The Fifth Circuit has taken the view that an employee does not en-
gage in protected activity when rejecting a supervisor's sexual ad-
vances,' whereas the Eighth Circuit has determined that the employee
engages in the "most basic form of protected activity" when rebuffing a
supervisor's advances. District courts reaching the Fifth Circuit's con-
clusion have expressed two rationales for not considering the rejection
alone to constitute protected activity: (1) Title VII's antidiscrimination
and antiretaliation provisions protect different types of conduct, and
the refusal is better protected by the antidiscrimination provision; and
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Law School.
1 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub L No 88-352, 78 Stat 253, codified at 42
USC § 2000e et seq.
2 42 USC § 2000e-3(a).
3 Murray v Chicago Transit Authority, 252 F3d 880,890 (7th Cir 2001).
4 An "express rejection" of sexual advances includes the employee either stating "no" to
the supervisor's advances or stating "no" with an ambiguous statement, such as "I do not like
you." An express rejection does not include the employee stating "no" in addition to stating that
the advance is unlawful. For a further discussion of the express rejection, see Part II.A.
5 See LeMaire v Louisiana Department of Transportation, 480 F3d 383,389 (5th Cir 2007);
Frank v Harris County, 118 Fed Appx 799,804 (5th Cir 2004).
6 Ogden v Wax Works Inc, 214 F3d 999,1007 (8th Cir 2000).
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(2) the rejection of a supervisor's advances lacks the antiretaliation
provision's requirement that the employee speak out against a practice.
On the other hand, courts reaching the Eighth Circuit's conclusion have
relied primarily on one rationale: the employee should be protected
when rejecting a supervisor's sexual advance because the advance itself
is an unlawful employment practice under Title VII.
Part I of this Comment begins with a brief overview of Title VII's
antidiscrimination and antiretaliation provisions and the Supreme
Court's limited guidance on the antiretaliation provision. Part II ex-
amines the various approaches taken by the circuit and district courts
to determine whether the rejection of sexual advances constitutes pro-
tected activity. Part III then reevaluates Title VII's protected activity
prong under two distinct factual situations: the single express rejection
of a sexual advance and the express rejection of an advance that is
part of a larger pattern of similar advances. This Part explains that
courts should examine each fact pattern in light of whether the em-
ployee had a reasonable belief that the supervisor's conduct violated
Title VII and whether the employee spoke out against an unlawful
practice. This Part concludes by explaining that although an employee's
express rejection of sexual advances does not constitute protected activ-
ity, the employee could fall within the protections of the antiretaliation
provision by explaining her reasons for refusing the advance to the su-
pervisor. Ultimately, this Comment does not seek to remove Title VII
protection when an employee rejects her supervisor's advances but ad-
vocates evaluating the employee's rejection under the proper Title VII
provision. This Comment concludes by explaining when Title VII's anti-
discrimination provision -rather than the antiretaliation provision-
applies to an employee's objections.
I. BACKGROUND: TITLE VII'S STATUTORY PROVISIONS
A. Title VII's Antidiscrimination Provision
Title VII's antidiscrimination provision seeks to protect em-
ployees from discrimination in the workplace based on social statuses,
such as race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. There are two basic
types of discrimination that are protected under the antidiscrimination
provision: discrimination in normal business operation and sexual ha-
rassment. Discrimination in normal business operation includes termi-
nation of employment, demotion, and the refusal to hire or promote an
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employee because of that employee's social status." Sexual harassment
includes "[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and
other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature."'
Within the realm of sexual harassment, courts traditionally have
recognized two forms of harassment: quid pro quo harassment and
hostile work environment harassment. Quid pro quo sexual harass-
ment occurs when an employer or supervisor attempts to extract sex-
ual favors from an employee by making threats or promises. To estab-
lish a successful quid pro quo claim, the employee must prove that:
(1) her supervisor tried to elicit sexual favors; and (2) she experienced
some changed term or condition of employment following the ha-
rassment.' Hostile work environment harassment differs from quid
pro quo harassment in that the employee does not experience a tangi-
ble adverse employment action as a result of the discrimination. In-
stead, an employee claiming hostile work environment harassment
must establish that the employer's harassment was "sufficiently severe
or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an ab-
usive atmosphere," and that the harassment was unwelcome.o Courts
consider the "frequency" and "severity" of the harassing conduct
when assessing a hostile work environment claim."
The Supreme Court has explained that an employer is generally
vicariously liable for the discriminatory actions of its supervisors but
allows the employer to assert an affirmative defense against liability
under certain circumstances. In Burlington Industries, Inc v Ellerth,"
the Court explained that the employer is always liable for its supervi-
sor's actions so long as the actions lead to a tangible employment ac-
tion, which includes "a significant change in employment status, such
as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly
different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in
benefits."" In practice, this means that an employer is generally liable
when a supervisor engages in quid pro quo harassment. On the other
7 For a discussion of Title VII harassment, see Eugene Scalia, The Strange Career of Quid
Pro Quo Sexual Harassment, 21 Harv J L & Pub Pol 307,308 (1998).
8 29 CFR § 1604.11(a).
9 See, for example, DeClue v Central Illinois Light Co, 223 F3d 434,437 (7th Cir 2000).
10 See, for example, McNeal v Montgomery County, 307 Fed Appx 766,776 (4th Cir 2009).
11 Id (concluding that "five accusations of theft and [the supervisor's] requirement that
[the employee] bring in doctor's notes and provide for more detail about his sick leave hardly
rise to the level of 'hostile or abusive' treatment").
12 524 US 742 (1998).
13 Id at 761 (noting that a "bruised ego" is not sufficient to establish a tangible employment
action).
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hand, the Court explained that when no tangible employment action is
taken (in a hostile work environment claim), the employer may raise
an affirmative defense to liability.4 This defense includes: (1) that the
employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly
the sexually harassing behavior; and (2) that the employee unreasona-
bly failed to take advantage of any preventative opportunities afforded
by the employer." In practice, this means that an employer can often
avoid liability for hostile work environment harassment, so long as it
can establish that it took reasonable steps to rectify the harassment.
B. Title VII's Antiretaliation Provision
Title VII's antiretaliation provision protects employees based on
their conduct, as opposed to employees' statuses (which are protected
by the antidiscrimination provision). The relevant text of the antiretal-
iation provision states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice" for an employer to
discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for em-
ployment ... because he has opposed any practice made an un-
lawful employment practice by [Title VII], or because he has
made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in
an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title VII]."
The first provision of the antiretaliation clause is known as the opposi-
tion clause; the second provision is known as the participation clause.
This Comment focuses solely on the opposition clause.
To establish the prima facie case of retaliation under the opposi-
tion clause, lower courts require the employee to demonstrate that:
(1) she engaged in an activity that Title VII protects (such as reporting
a Title VII violation to a human resources supervisor); (2) she was
subjected to an adverse action; and (3) a causal connection exists be-
14 Id at 765.
15 Id. See Faragher v City of Boca Raton, 524 US 775,807 (1998).
16 For purposes of this Comment, an unlawful employment practice is either quid pro quo
or hostile work environment harassment.
17 42 USC § 2000e-3(a) (emphasis added).
18 The participation clause, which covers nearly all incidents in which an employee com-
municates allegations or evidence of discrimination to a civil rights enforcement agency or parti-
cipates in an employer's internal investigation pursuant to an Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) charge, does not apply when the employee complains directly to her su-
pervisor. See Abbott v Crown Motor Co, 348 F3d 537, 543 (6th Cir 2003); EEOC v Total System
Services Inc, 221 F3d 1171, 1174 n 2 (11th Cir 2000) (noting that the participation clause does not
protect an employee's participation in "an employer's internal, in-house investigation, conducted
apart from a formal charge with the EEOC").
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tween the opposition and the adverse action.'9 A minority of circuit
courts also requires that the employee prove a fourth element-that
the employer was aware of the employee's opposition." For the pur-
poses of this Comment, protected activity involves an employee's op-
position to an unlawful employment practice -namely, her opposition
to her supervisor's sexual advances.
Title VII indicates that all opposition claims must include an un-
derlying discrimination claim, although the employee is not required
to succeed on her discrimination claim to prevail on a retaliation
claim. The typical sequence of events in an opposition clause case
based on quid pro quo harassment proceeds as follows: (1) the super-
visor solicits sexual favors but is rebuffed; (2) an adverse employment
action is taken against the employee; (3) the employee opposes the
conduct (for example, by complaining of the adverse action to a hu-
man resources representative); and (4) an adverse action is taken
against the employee because of her opposition.2' If the employee al-
leges hostile work environment harassment, then the first two steps of
the sequence instead involve multiple discriminatory acts." Although
an employee can file both a discrimination claim and a retaliation
claim, Title VII's statutory cap on compensatory and punitive damages
often limits an employee's total potential recovery." Thus, some indi-
viduals will not gain additional damages for concurrent discrimination
and retaliation claims,2 whereas others will obtain additional damages
when bringing concurrent claims.
19 See, for example, Davis v Coca-Cola Bottling Co, 516 F3d 955, 978 n 52 (11th Cir 2008);
Harvill v Westward Communications, 433 F3d 428,439 (5th Cir 2005).
20 See, for example, McMenemy v City of Rochester, 241 F3d 279,282-83 (2d Cir 2001).
21 The first two elements constitute the underlying discrimination claim, and the second
two elements form the retaliation claim. See, for example, Russell v University of Texas, 234 Fed
Appx 195, 198-200 (5th Cir 2007) (outlining a sequence that began with unwanted sexual ad-
vances by a supervisor, rejection of those advances by the employee, the supervisor's rejection of
employee's application for a tenure-track position, the employee filing an informal grievance for
harassment, and failure of the supervisor to renew the employee's contract).
22 A hostile work environment claim does not include an adverse employment action in
response to the discriminatory act, which means that the second element is not present for these
claims. See, for example, Williams v WD Sport Inc, 497 F3d 1079,1084 (10th Cir 2007).
2 See 42 USC § 1981a(b). For example, for employers with more than five hundred em-
ployees, the statutory cap is set at $300,000. Id.
24 See, for example, Ogden v Wax Works Inc, 214 F3d 999, 1002, 1009-11 (8th Cir 2000)
(noting that the plaintiff could only recover $260,000 even though the jury awarded $300,000 for
her hostile work environment claim due to the statutory cap).
2 For example, in Hudson v Reno, 130 F3d 1193 (6th Cir 1997), because the plaintiff only
received $250,000 for her discrimination claim, the district court allowed her to recover an addi-
tional $50,000 in damages for her retaliation claim. Id at 1196. Although the jury originally
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The opposition clause excludes from protected activity any claims
that are "completely groundless."6 The plaintiff must establish: (1) that
she has a good faith belief that the employer is engaging in an unlaw-
ful employment practice; and (2) that the belief is objectively reason-
able in light of the facts.2 This only requires that the discrimination
claim appear legitimate on the surface. It does not require that the
employee prevail on her Title VII discrimination claim or have op-
posed a practice that in fact violated Title VII before succeeding on a
retaliation claim. Thus, it is improper for an employer to retaliate
against any employee making a good faith, yet unsuccessful, discrimi-
nation complaint. Courts have found opposition conduct under the
antiretaliation provision in a number of circumstances, such as when
an employee files an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) complaint," files a formal complaint with the employer's
human resources department,n or files a police report."
The Supreme Court recently addressed the scope of the opposi-
tion clause in Crawford v Metropolitan Government of Nashville,2
holding that the opposition clause extends to an employee who speaks
out against discrimination during an employer's internal investigation,
even when the employee does not initiate the complaint to the Human
Resources department." The Court explained that there is "nothing in
[Title VII that] requires a freakish rule protecting an employee who
reports discrimination on her own initiative but not one who reports the
same discrimination in the same words when her boss asks a question." 4
Thus, the Court determined that it is sufficient that the employee notify
awarded the employee $500,000 for the retaliation claim, the court capped this amount at
$50,000 to comply with Title VII's statutory cap. Id.
26 Fine v Ryan International Airlines, 305 F3d 746,752 (7th Cir 2002) (stating that courts find
claims to be groundless when they rest on "facts that no reasonable person possibly could have
construed as a case of discrimination"). See also McDonnell v Cisneros, 84 F3d 256, 259 (7th Cir
1996) ("There is nothing wrong with disciplining an employee for filing frivolous complaints.").
27 Peters v Jenney, 327 F3d 307,321 (4th Cir 2003). See Brannum v Missouri Department of
Corrections, 518 F3d 542,547 (8th Cir 2008); Fine, 305 F3d at 752.
28 See, for example, Fine, 305 F3d at 752 (noting that the claim is not groundless when
discovery and a harder look at the full picture reveal that apparently legitimate claims ultimately
lack merit).
29 See, for example, Fischer v Avanade, Inc, 519 F3d 393,409 (7th Cir 2008); Ray v Hender-
son, 217 F3d 1234,1240 n 3 (9th Cir 2000); Walker v Thompson, 214 F3d 615,629 (5th Cir 2000).
30 See, for example, Mariani-Colon v Department of Homeland Security, 511 F3d 216, 223
(1st Cir 2007); Kasper v Federated Mutual Insurance Co, 425 F3d 496,502 (8th Cir 2005).
31 See, for example, Scarbrough v Board of Trustees Florida A&M University, 504 F3d
1220,1222 (11th Cir 2007); Worth v Tyer, 276 F3d 249,265 (7th Cir 2001).
32 129 S Ct 846 (2009).
33 Id at 849.
3 Id at 851.
526 [77:521
When "No" Is Not Enough
her employer of her supervisor's conduct by answering questions, even
if this opposition is merely reactive."
Although the Supreme Court answered the question of whether
an employee must initiate the opposition conduct in an internal inves-
tigation (finding that this is not a requirement), the Court did not an-
swer the question presented by this Comment: whether an employee
engages in protected activity under Title VII's opposition clause when
she expressly rejects her supervisor's sexual advances. In fact, the two
concurring justices in Crawford emphasized that "[t]he question
whether the opposition clause shields employees who do not commu-
nicate their views to their employers through purposive conduct is not
before us in this case; the answer to that question is far from clear."1
Instead, the Court simply highlighted the ambiguity in this area, with-
out speaking to the present issue.
II. CONFLICTING CASE LAW ON THE EXPRESS REJECTION OF
SEXUAL ADVANCES
Within the last two decades, the circuit and district courts have at-
tempted to differentiate the type of conduct that is and is not pro-
tected by Title VII's antiretaliation provision. The courts currently are
split or undecided on the issue of whether rejecting a supervisor's sex-
ual advances constitutes protected activity under Title VII's opposi-
tion clause. Whereas the Eighth Circuit and a number of district courts
have held that rejecting a supervisor's sexual advances constitutes
protected activity, the Fifth Circuit and an equally large number of
district courts have held that the rejection does not constitute pro-
tected activity. Additionally, a number of circuit courts have recog-
nized this issue but have failed to reach a decision on the merits." De-
35 Id.
36 Crawford, 129 S Ct at 855 (Alito concurring). Although the majority, in dicta, rejected
the employer's argument that inappropriate conduct, such as "flip[ping] [the supervisor] a bird,"
did not constitute protected activity, id at 851 n 2, the concurrence made clear that the Court was
not addressing the question presented in this Comment. Rather, the majority's statement was
simply concerned with the employee's characterization of her response to the human resources
representative, not her response to the supervisor. See id at 855.
37 See Tate v Executive Management Services, Inc, 546 F3d 528, 532 (7th Cir 2008) (declin-
ing to resolve the circuit split because the plaintiff did not establish that he "reasonably believed
in good faith [that] the practice [he] opposed violated Title VII"); Fitzgerald v Henderson, 251
F3d 345, 366 (2d Cir 2001) (concluding that because the plaintiffs retaliation claim was coexten-
sive with her hostile work environment claim and would not warrant a distinct award, the court
need not reach the issue of whether the plaintiff engaged in protected activity when resisting a
supervisor's sexual advances); Farrell v Planters Lifesavers Co, 206 F3d 271, 279 n 4 (3d Cir 2000)
(noting that because the issue was not raised on appeal, it did not have to be decided before the
2010] 527
The University of Chicago Law Review
spite the relative evenness of the split, few courts have provided the
same justifications for their decisions.
This Part first explains the scope of this Comment and the question
that this Comment seeks to answer: whether an express rejection of sex-
ual advances constitutes protected activity. Part II.B-C then provides an
overview of the approaches used by courts finding that the rejection of
sexual advances should constitute protected activity and those finding
that this conduct should fall outside the antiretaliation provision.
A. The Express Rejection of Sexual Advances
This Comment addresses whether an employee engages in pro-
tected activity under Title VII's antiretaliation provision when she re-
jects her supervisor's sexual advances. For the purposes of this Com-
ment, "sexual advances" is used to describe a broad range of conduct
whereby a supervisor' solicits an employee for sexual activity or dis-
cusses sexually explicit topics with the employee. For example, sexual
advances can include explicit conduct, such as asking the employee to
engage in sexual relations," inviting the employee to a motel room,"' and
asking the employee to engage in a relationship," or less extreme con-
duct, such as telling the employee sexually explicit stories.42
This Comment is also limited to evaluating situations in which an
employee makes an "express rejection" to her supervisor's sexual ad-
vances. An express rejection occurs when an employee simply states
"no" in response to her supervisor's advances or states "no" in addi-
tion to a personal reason for the rejection." Thus, this Comment's dis-
cussion of an employee's express rejection does not refer to those re-
jections that include an explanation for the opposition that references
court); Jordan v Clark, 847 F2d 1368, 1376 (9th Cir 1988) (determining that the district court's
findings were not clearly erroneous that the "advances [did not] actually occur[] and were [not]
an 'unlawful employment practice').
38 All of the circuit and district court cases in this Comment address the employee's rejec-
tion of a supervisor's advances, as compared to a coworker's or an employer's advances.
39 See, for example, Clark, 847 F2d at 1371.
40 See, for example, Ogden v Wax Works Inc, 214 F3d 999, 1003 (8th Cir 2000); Coe v
Northern Pipe Products; Inc, 589 F Supp 2d 1055, 1069 (ND Iowa 2008).
41 See, for example, Tate, 546 F3d at 530.
42 See, for example, LeMaire v Louisiana Department of Transportation, 480 F3d 383. 385
(5th Cir 2007).
43 Courts often rely on the phrase "express rejection" to describe an employee's refusal of
sexual advances. For example, if the employee stated, "No, I am married," this constitutes an
express rejection because the employee has not indicated that she believes the advance to be
unlawful. See Tate, 546 F3d at 530 (indicating that the employee expressly rejected his supervi-
sor's sexual advances, when he stated that he "just wanted to keep the slate clean between [him]
and [his] wife").
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Title VII or makes some indication that the employee believes the
conduct to be unlawful.
B. Eighth Circuit's Approach: The Rejection of Sexual Advances Is
Protected Activity
The Eighth Circuit has determined that an employee engages in
protected activity when rejecting a supervisor's sexual advances. In
Ogden v Wax Works, Inc," the employee, Kerry Ogden, was proposi-
tioned multiple times by her supervisor,4 ' and, when she rebuffed his
advances, he criticized her performance and routinely screamed at
her." Ogden also alleged that her supervisor conditioned her evalua-
tion and her raise on her willingness to submit to his advances and
that he declined her request to take vacation leave after she refused to
accompany him on a three-day vacation. The court agreed with Og-
den that she engaged in the "most basic form of protected activity"
when she told her supervisor to stop his offensive conduct, which es-
tablished a valid retaliation claim." The court relied on lower court
cases reaching the same conclusion without providing any additional
justification or explanation for its holding. In addition to the retalia-
tion claim, the court also upheld the jury's finding that there was suffi-
cient evidence to support Ogden's quid pro quo and hostile work en-
vironment harassment claims under the antidiscrimination provision."
Most district courts finding protected activity rely on the reason-
ing that opposing sexually harassing behavior constitutes "opposing
any practice" made unlawful by Title VII. Because these courts deter-
mine that sexual harassment is an unlawful employment practice, and
an employee's refusal is a means of opposing such behavior, they con-
clude that the refusal should constitute protected activity." For exam-
ple, in Roberts v County of Cook," the plaintiff alleged that her super-
visor repeatedly reduced her job responsibilities after she resisted his
44 214 F3d 999 (8th Cir 2000).
45 Id at 1003 (indicating that Ogden's supervisor grabbed Ogden by her waist and asked
her to a hotel room and put his arm around Ogden in a bar while intoxicated on two occasions).
46 Id.
47 Id at 1003-04. Ogden ultimately ended her employment with Wax Works before receiv-
ing an annual raise based on her supervisor's evaluation. Id at 1004.
48 Ogden, 214 F3d at 1007.
49 See id.
50 Id at 1006.
51 See, for example, Little v NBC, 210 F Supp 2d 330,385-86 (SDNY 2002). See also Wagn-
er v Burnham, 2006 WL 266551, *17 (NDNY) (collecting cases).
52 2004 WL 1088230 (ND Ill).
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sexual advances." The court found that her refusals constituted pro-
tected activity because sexual harassment is an unlawful employment
practice under Title VII." The court also based its conclusion on
Title VII's purpose of protecting employees in the workplace, stating
that the "victim of harassment should not fear retaliation if she resists
sexually predatory behavior by colleagues or supervisors."" Other dis-
trict courts have reached the same conclusion by citing to older dis-
trict court cases without providing any further discussion."
In addition, the Southern District of New York has found that re-
jecting a supervisor's sexual advances constitutes protected activity
when the specific circumstances of the case indicate that the plaintiff
does not have other means available for reporting the discriminatory
conduct." In Laurin v Pokoik,s the plaintiff, Eleanor Laurin, com-
plained that she was fired after she rejected her supervisor's sexual
advances." The court noted that although Laurin's retaliation claim
seemed duplicative of her discrimination claim, no formal internal
complaint mechanism was in place to allow her to voice her opposi-
tion when her alleged harasser was also her supervisor.6 Because de-
clining the sexual advances was one of very few options available for
opposing the conduct, the court concluded that, "given the circums-
tances," her refusals constituted protected activity.6' The court did not
address Laurin's discrimination claim because it was not before the
court on summary judgment.
53 Id at *3. See Roberts v County of Cook, 213 F Supp 2d 882, 886 (ND Ill 2002) ("Roberts
alleges that she was demoted from an office manager to a receptionist, transferred from an office
to a space in a file room, that her responsibilities were significantly reduced to menial ones, and
her opportunities for promotion were diminished.").
5 Roberts, 2004 WL 1088230 at *4-5.
55 Id at *5.
56 These older court cases include: Fleming v South Carolina Department of Corrections, 952
F Supp 283,288 (D SC 1996); Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v Dominos Pizza, Inc,
909 F Supp 1529,1536 (MD Fla 1995); Burrell v City University of New York, 894 F Supp 750, 761
(SDNY 1995); Boyd v James S. Hayes Living Health Care Agency, Inc, 671 F Supp 1155,1167 (WD
Tenn 1987).
57 Laurin v Pokoik, 2005 WL 911429, *4 (SDNY). See also Estes v Illinois Department of
Human Services, 2007 WL 551554, *4 (ND Ill) (holding that the plaintiff engaged in protected
activity when the alleged harasser was the plaintiffs supervisor and the company made no effort
to apprise the plaintiff of its sexual harassment policy).
58 2005 WL 911429 (SDNY).
59 Id at *1-2 (explaining that the sexual advances included sexual jokes and comments in
the office and Laurin's supervisor groping her on several occasions).
60 Id at *4 (noting that the only other two possible supervisors included her harasser's
business partner and an attorney).
61 Id.
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C. Fifth Circuit's Approach: The Rejection of Sexual Advances Is
Not Protected Activity
The Fifth Circuit, on the other hand, has held that an express re-
jection of a supervisor's sexual advances does not constitute protected
activity. In LeMaire v Louisiana Department of Transportation,62 the
employee, Rene LeMaire, alleged that his supervisor, Milton Endres,
told him sexually explicit stories on two occasions and subjected him
to derogatory comments.6 After LeMaire objected to these stories,
Endres ordered LeMaire to spray herbicide on a large lawn, which
LeMaire considered to be outside of his job description and a retalia-
tory act as a result of his objection." LeMaire later complained to
another supervisor about the sexually explicit stories and Endres's
supposed retaliatory conduct.6 Approximately two weeks after the
incident, LeMaire was given a two-week suspension for refusing to
spray the herbicide as directed by Endres and ultimately was termi-
nated two months after the incident."
Despite this "arguabl[y] protected activity," the Fifth Circuit con-
cluded that "LeMaire . . . provides no authority for the proposition
that rejecting sexual advances constitutes a protected activity for pur-
poses of a retaliation claim under Title VII." 6 The court relied on an
unpublished Fifth Circuit opinion reaching the same conclusion but,
like the Eighth Circuit, provided no further substantive reasoning.6
Although the court did not find in favor of LeMaire for the retaliation
claim, it determined that the district court erred in granting the em-
ployer's motion for summary judgment on LeMaire's hostile work
environment and same-sex harassment claims and, accordingly, re-
61
manded the case to the district court.
A significant number of district courts also have determined that the
refusal of a supervisor's sexual advances is not protected by Title VII's
62 480 F3d 383 (5th Cir 2007).
63 Id at 385.
6 Id (noting that LeMaire's job normally consisted of operating power-driven drawbridges
and performing or overseeing maintenance on the bridges).
65 Id.
6 LeMaire, 480 F3d at 385-86.
67 Id at 389.
68 See id, citing Frank v Harris County, 118 Fed Appx 799,804 (5th Cir 2004) (rejecting the
plaintiff's claim when the opposition "consisted largely of unexpressed disapproval and was not
reported to the county or the EEOC prior to termination"). Although LeMaire was decided
after Ogden, the LeMaire court did not mention the possibility that Ogden would provide au-
thority for LeMaire's retaliation claim.
69 LeMaire, 480 F3d at 388.
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antiretaliation provision. These courts traditionally have relied on two
rationales to reach this conclusion: (1) that including the refusal of sexual
advances within Title VII's antiretaliation provision would conflate the
antidiscrimination and antiretaliation provisions; and (2) that rejecting a
supervisor's advances lacks the antiretaliation provision's requirement of
speaking out against a discriminatory practice.70
Courts applying the first rationale-that the antidiscrimination
and antiretaliation provisions should remain separate protections for
Title VII plaintiffs-have concluded that the refusal of sexual ad-
vances does not fall within the antiretaliation provision. For example,
in Del Castillo v Pathmark Stores," the Southern District of New York
held that, even under the broadest interpretation of the antiretaliation
provision, rejecting a harasser's sexual advances does not constitute
protected activity.7 The court feared that "otherwise, every harassment
claim would automatically state a retaliation claim as well," especially
when the supervisor was the only individual to know of the alleged
protected activity.? Many courts also have reasoned that Title VII's
antiretaliation provision should not protect conduct that is already
protected by the antidiscrimination provision.
District courts applying the second justification have held that
"[c]entral to all of the[] illustrative examples of behavior protected by
70 A third group of courts has refused to extend Title VII's antiretaliation provision to
protect an employee from a supervisor's sexual advances, stating that there is no authority to
indicate that the refusal of sexual advances constitutes protected activity. See Monteagudo v Aso-
ciacion de Empleados Del Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico, 425 F Supp 2d 206,212-13 (D PR
2006) ("Neither the First Circuit, nor any other circuit, has ruled on whether resisting an employ-
er's sexual advances constitutes protected activity for purposes of establishing retaliation."). But
see NBC, 210 F Supp 2d at 385 (relying on the same reasoning that circuit courts have not ad-
dressed this issue but concluding that the antiretaliation provision's protections apply to the
rejection of sexual advances). This does not appear to be a distinct rationale as to why an em-
ployee's conduct should not constitute protected activity.
71 941 F Supp 437 (SDNY 1996).
72 Id at 438-39.
73 Id at 439.
74 See Farfaras v Citizen Bank and Trust of Chicago, 2004 WL 2034077, *2 (ND Ill) (ruling
that although the plaintiff did not assert a valid retaliation claim, the rejection of her supervisor's
advances formed a valid sex discrimination claim); Schwartz v Bay Industries, Inc, 274 F Supp 2d
1041, 1046 (ED Wis 2003) (determining that the plaintiffs rejection of sexual advances "seem[s]
to state a claim of quid pro quo sexual harassment rather than retaliation"); Jones v County of
Cook, 2002 WL 1611606, *4 (ND Ill) ("While [the refused sexual advances] may give rise to a
claim for sexual discrimination, it does not state a claim for retaliation."); Rashid v Beth Israel
Medical Center, 1998 WL 689931, *2 (SDNY) ("A retaliation claim, under these circumstances, is
duplicative and unnecessary, and runs the risk of confusing a jury."); Finley v Rodman & Ren-
shaw, Inc, 1993 WL 512608, *3 (ND Ill) ("Plaintiffs allegations that [her supervisor] retaliated
against her for not reciprocating his advances is a charge that fits more readily under her sexual
harassment claim.").
When "No" Is Not Enough
the opposition clause is the element of speaking out against a practice
. . . because the plaintiff believes it is illegal."" In Rachel-Smith v
FTData, Inc,6 for example, the Victoria Rachel-Smith's supervisor,
Frank McLallen, approached her on several occasions and made sex-
ual advances toward her. , After Rachel-Smith sent an email to McLal-
len informing him of "her desire to cease all kissing and other sexual
episodes," she was informed that she would be terminated from her
position." The court held that Rachel-Smith's verbal communications
to McLallen did not constitute protected activity because she did not
voice complaints about a practice that she thought was illegal." The
court indicated that "the purpose of this speaking out or reporting re-
quirement is a logical one: in order to protect an employee from an em-
ployer's retaliation for opposing a practice, the employer must first have
been placed on notice of a problematic practice."8 Accordingly, Rachel-
Smith's conduct did not qualify for the antiretaliation provision's pro-
tections because her verbal communications neither spoke out against
McLallen's behavior nor reported the behavior to an outsider."
III. SOLUTION: REEVALUATING PROTECTED ACTIVITY
This Comment argues that the courts reaching the Eighth Circuit's
conclusion incorrectly determine that the refusal of a supervisor's sex-
ual advances per se constitutes protected activity under Title VII's
antiretaliation provision. These courts, as well as the courts reaching
the Fifth Circuit's conclusion, err by considering all rejections of sex-
ual advances in the same manner, instead of distinguishing between
those cases that involve a single sexual advance and those that begin
with a pattern of discriminatory conduct and culminate in a sexual
advance. Without considering the factual differences between these
cases, courts fail to determine whether the employee reasonably be-
lieved that her supervisor's conduct constituted discrimination and
75 See Rachel-Smith v FTData, Inc, 247 F Supp 2d 734,748 (D Md 2003). See also Coe, 589
F Supp 2d at 1105 (explaining that the employee did not engage in protected activity when she
did not indicate to her employer that she believed the advance constituted protected activity
until after the adverse employment action occurred); Jones, 2002 WL 1611606 at *3. Compare
Robinson v MINACT Inc, 2007 WL 2874602, *3 (WD La) (noting that the employee did not
engage in protected activity when she did not report her supervisor's sexual advance to other
supervisors in the company).
76 247 F Supp 2d 734 (D Md 2003).
7 Id at 741-42.
78 Id.
79 Id at 748.
a0 Rachel-Smith, 247 F Supp 2d at 748.
81 Id at 748-49.
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whether the employee rejected the advance for the reason that it con-
stituted unlawful discrimination under Title VII.
This Part provides a framework under which courts should de-
termine whether an employee engages in protected activity when re-
jecting a supervisor's sexual advances. Part III.A explains that courts
should consider two factors in determining whether an employee en-
gages in protected activity: whether the employee reasonably believed
that her employer's conduct constituted unlawful discrimination and
whether the employee spoke out against an unlawful employment
practice. Although some courts have considered these factors in isola-
tion, no court has considered both requirements together. Part III.B
then explains the two circumstances under which the sexual advance
can arise and argues that courts should consider the important factual
differences between these scenarios. Part III.C applies the principles
established in Part III.A to the two scenarios explained in Part III.B,
concluding that an employee does not engage in protected activity
when expressly rejecting a supervisor's advances, both when the ad-
vance is an isolated incident and when the incident is preceded by a
pattern of discrimination. Part III.D concludes with an explanation of
when a court should find that an employee engaged in protected activ-
ity when rejecting a supervisor's sexual advance, and when the antidi-
scrimination provision instead protects the employee.
A. Requirements for Protected Activity
When evaluating an employee's express rejection of her supervi-
sor's sexual advances, courts should consider whether the employee
had a reasonable belief that the supervisor's conduct violated Title VII
and whether the employee effectively spoke out against a practice
because that practice is unlawful under Title VII. Although courts
generally require employees to establish these elements in other
Title VII retaliation contexts, the courts discussing the express rejec-
tion of sexual advances surprisingly have been silent on these re-
quirements. This Part advocates that courts should reintegrate these
factors into their discussions of the rejection of sexual advances.
1. The employee must reasonably believe that her supervisor's
conduct violated Title VII.
Courts examining Title VII retaliation cases traditionally have
examined whether the employee reasonably believed that she op-
posed an unlawful employment practice. Curiously, courts addressing
the present question overwhelmingly have not referenced this re-
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quirement. This Part argues that courts should conduct this reasona-
ble belief inquiry when determining whether an employee engages in
protected activity when rejecting a supervisor's sexual advances in
order to align the present issue with other areas of antiretaliation case
law. So long as the employee had a reasonable belief that her supervi-
sor's conduct constituted discrimination-regardless of the success of
the discrimination claim-the employee should be permitted to bring
a retaliation claim.
Traditionally, to establish that the employee had a reasonable be-
lief that her supervisor's actions constituted discrimination, courts
require the employee to show that she had both a subjective and an
objectively reasonable belief that her supervisor's conduct was unlaw-
ful." Under the first requirement, the subjective belief, the employee
must simply establish that that she had an "honest and bona fide" be-
lief that the supervisor's conduct violated Title VII." Courts generally
find that the employee can meet the subjective requirement, absent
some contrary indication. The second component of the reasonable-
ness test requires more than the employee's own belief: "[T]he allega-
tions and record must also indicate that the belief, though perhaps
mistaken, was objectively reasonable." 5 Courts examine whether a
reasonable person would have considered the supervisor's actions to
constitute Title VII discrimination. Although the employee does not
need to establish that the conduct actually violated Title VII, the claim
cannot be supported by hypothetical future events.
When deciding the second prong of the reasonableness test, the
objective element, courts often examine whether the employee's claim
8 A survey of antiretaliation cases involving the rejection of sexual advances indicates that
only two courts have considered whether the employee's belief was reasonable. See Tate v Ex-
ecutive Management Services, 546 F3d 528, 532-33 (7th Cir 2008); Coe v Northern Pipe Products,
589 F Supp 2d 1055,1104 (ND Iowa 2008).
8 See, for example, Butler v Alabama Department of Transportation, 536 F3d 1209, 1213
(11th Cir 2008); Little v United Technologies, 103 F3d 956,960 (11th Cir 1997).
84 United Technologies, 103 F3d at 960. See also Rucker v Higher Education Aids Board,
669 F2d 1179, 1182 (7th Cir 1982) ("[The mistaken belief] must, of course, be a sincere one; and
presumably it must be reasonable ... for it seems unlikely that the framers of Title VII would
have wanted to encourage the filing of utterly baseless charges by preventing employers from
disciplining the employees who made them.").
85 United Technologies, 103 F3d at 960.
86 See Livingston v Wyeth, Inc, 520 F3d 344, 352 (4th Cir 2008) ("We rejected the claim [ ]
that a reasonable belief that a violation has occurred or is in progress can include a belief that a
violation is about to happen upon some future contingency."); Jordan v Alternative Resources
Corp, 458 F3d 332, 340 (4th Cir 2006) (concluding that the employee could not objectively be-
lieve that his coworker's single racist statement constituted hostile work environment harass-
ment when the coworker did not have a "plan in motion" to continue the harassment).
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referenced the relevant elements of Title VII that the supervisor alle-
gedly violated. For example, in Barker v Missouri Department of Cor-
rections,n the Eighth Circuit dismissed the employee's retaliation
claim because a reasonable person would not have concluded that his
supervisor's conduct constituted hostile work environment harass-
ment." The employee, John Barker, alleged that he was suspended
after helping another male employee complain that their female super-
visor engaged in discriminatory conduct when she stated that women
are better than men at their jobs." The court concluded that the supervi-
sor's "single, isolated statement, implying that women are more nurtur-
ing and better suited for work ... is insufficient as a matter of law to
support an objectively reasonable belief that the statement constituted
sexual harassment."" The court cited two other Eighth Circuit cases
finding that isolated remarks or short patterns of inappropriate state-
ments are not sufficient to support a conclusion that the supervisor's
statement constituted hostile work environment harassment, as the
statement was not objectively "severe and pervasive."" Accordingly,
without an objectively reasonable belief that the supervisor's statement
met the elements of a hostile work environment harassment claim,
Barker could not succeed on his retaliation claim."
Courts addressing quid pro quo harassment have reached similar
results, finding that an employee cannot reasonably believe that her
supervisor engaged in discriminatory conduct when the elements of a
quid pro quo claim have not been established. For example, in Coe v
Northern Pipe Products, Inc," the Northern District of Iowa held that
the employee did not have an objectively reasonable belief that her
supervisor's sexual advances constituted quid pro quo harassment
because she did "not allege that any job benefit or job detriment was
expressly or even impliedly made contingent upon her acceptance or
rejection of the alleged sexual advances."" Without the adverse action,
the court concluded that the employee could not establish the requi-
87 513 F3d 831 (8th Cir 2008).
8 Id at 833,835.
89 Id at 833.
90 Id at 835.
91 Barker, 513 F3d at 835, citing LeGrand v Area Resources for Community & Human
Services, 394 F3d 1098, 1101-02 (8th Cir 2005) (ruling that a priest's statements did not constitute
harassment when he made unwelcome sexual advances on three separate occasions); Duncan v
General Motors Corp, 300 F3d 928,933-34 (8th Cir 2002) (holding that five incidents are insuffi-
cient to establish an actionable hostile work environment harassment claim).
92 Barker, 513 F3d at 835.
93 589 F Supp 2d 1055 (ND Iowa 2008).
9 Id at 1104.
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site elements of the quid pro quo claim, making her belief about the
unlawful nature of the sexual advances unreasonable." Other courts
have highlighted the presence of an adverse action against the em-
ployee as evidence of the employee's reasonable belief of quid pro
quo harassment.%
There are cases, though, where courts have determined that the
employee's belief was reasonable, even when the jury ruled against
the employee on the discrimination claim. For example, in Fine v Ryan
International Airlines,9 the Seventh Circuit determined that Ryan In-
ternational Airlines retaliated against its employee, Lisa Fine, despite
the fact that Fine's discrimination claim lost at the summary judgment
stage." The court noted that when Fine complained of inequitable
treatment of female pilots, she knew that she had been experiencing a
delay in training that none of her male counterparts received, that she
had been treated differently from a similarly situated male employee
on one occasion, and that other female employees had been de-
moted." Thus, because a jury "could easily find" that Fine reasonably
believed she was opposing discriminatory conduct when she com-
plained to a supervisor (even though the jury in this particular case
did not), the court denied the employer's motion for summary judg-
ment on the retaliation claim.'
2. The employee must "speak out" against an unlawful employ-
ment practice.
In addition to the requirement that the employee reasonably be-
lieve that her supervisor's conduct violated Title VII, the employee
must also indicate that she is speaking out against the unlawful em-
ployment practice to engage in protected activity. It is not sufficient
that the employee believe that the supervisor's conduct was objective-
ly unreasonable; she must also explain that she is objecting to the un-
lawful behavior for the reason that the conduct violates Title VII. Al-
though courts have not uniformly adopted this approach in all
95 Id.
96 See, for example, Holland v Jefferson National Life Insurance Co, 883 F2d 1307, 1314
(7th Cir 1989).
9 305 F3d 746 (7th Cir 2002).
98 Id at 752-53.
99 Id at 752.
100 Id.
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Title VII contexts,"o' this Comment argues that courts should consider
this factor when evaluating the express rejection of sexual advances.
The requirement that the employee must speak out against an
unlawful employment practice stems from Title VII's statutory lan-
guage. As explained in Part I.A, the opposition clause of the antiretal-
iation provision protects an employee who "oppose[s] any practice
made an unlawful employment practice" under Title VII." This lan-
guage indicates that the employee cannot simply state that she is un-
happy with workplace conditions, but she must establish that her
complaint is related to the supervisor's underlying discrimination. Be-
cause an employee could have alternative reasons for rejecting a su-
pervisor's sexual advances, such as personal distaste for the supervisor,
courts should require the employee to explain her reasons for the re-
jection and to indicate that her rejection is based on conduct prohi-
bited by Title VII.
Lower courts generally agree that the employee must state more
than a general complaint to be afforded antiretaliation protection.'o
For example, in Sitar v Indiana Department of Corrections,' the Se-
venth Circuit determined that an employee did not engage in pro-
tected activity when she complained to her supervisor about her poor
treatment in the office.'o The court explained that these complaints
only indicated that she felt picked on, not that she was being discrimi-
nated against "because of" her gender."6The court acknowledged that
while the employee was not required to use "magic words" when mak-
ing her informal complaint, she "has to at least say something to indi-
cate her [gender] is an issue."" Similarly, in Klopfenstein v National
101 At least the Seventh and Ninth Circuits have recognized the importance of an employee
"speaking out" under Title VII's antiretaliation provision. See, for example, Sitar v Indiana De-
partment of Corrections, 344 F3d 720,727 (7th Cir 2003); Hernandez v Spacelabs Medical Inc, 343
F3d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir 2003) ("[Title VII] protects against retaliation for the exercise of the
right to speak out against discrimination.").
102 See 42 USC § 2000e-3(a).
103 See, for example, Garza v Laredo Independent School District, 309 Fed Appx 806, 810
(5th Cir 2009) (holding that a general complaint about a principal and the manner in which a
school functioned, without any mention of discriminatory issues, did not qualify as a protected
activity for the purposes of a retaliation claim); Curay-Cramer v The Ursuline Academy of Wil-
mington, Delaware, Inc, 450 F3d 130, 135 (3d Cir 2006); Couture v JMJ, Inc, 1999 WL 140603, *1
(9th Cir); McNair v Computer Data Systems, 1999 WL 30959, *5 (4th Cir) (holding that a letter
expressing general "concern" about unfair treatment does not qualify as a charge of unlawful
discrimination to satisfy the protected activity element).
10 344 F3d 720 (7th Cir 2003).
105 Id at 727.
106 Id.
107 Id, quoting Miller v American Family Mutual Insurance, 203 F3d 997,1008 (7th Cir 2000).
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Sales and Supply,'. the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found that the
employee did not engage in protected activity when she refused to
serve coffee to her male supervisors.M The court explained that because
Tamara Klopfenstein's refusal neither alleged unlawful discrimination
nor indicated that she was objecting to "subservient gender roles," it
could not "translate into a charge of gender discrimination.,,no Instead,
Klopfenstein needed to indicate to her supervisors that her gender was
the basis for her claim.
The Eastern District of Wisconsin has applied this analysis more
explicitly to the express rejection of sexual advances."' In Schwartz v
Bay Industries Inc,"2 the employee, Peggy Schwartz, alleged that she
rebuffed her direct supervisor's advances, which included grabbing,
fondling, and kissing her at a restaurant, and that she was transferred
to another office location as a result."' Although her retaliation claim
reflected that she continually "rebuffed" her supervisor's advances,
she never indicated that she rejected his behavior because she be-
lieved it to be unlawful under Title VII, as compared to rejecting the
advances for any number of personal reasons."' Accordingly, the court
rejected her retaliation claim.
Requiring an employee to explain why she is rejecting her super-
visor's advances does not mean, however, that it is necessary for the
employee to follow formal complaint mechanisms in order to be af-
forded antiretaliation protection. Title VII aims to facilitate informal
complaint processes,"' such as complaining about a discriminatory
practice to a supervisor or using the employer's internal complaint
mechanism, and does not require that the employee use any "magic
words," such as "Title VII discrimination" or "sex discrimination,"
108 2008 WL 2331948 (ED Pa).
109 Id at *2 (explaining that the employee considered serving her male supervisors to be
"demeaning and embarrassing" and to "reinforce outdated gender stereotypes," although she
never stated this explanation to her supervisors).
110 Id at *5n2.
111 Although the court did examine whether the employee spoke out against an unlawful
employment practice, it did not consider whether the employee had an objectively reasonable
belief that the conduct violated Title VII, as required by Part III.A.1. The Seventh Circuit has
also adopted this approach in Title VII cases. See Gates v Caterpillar, Inc, 513 F3d 680, 687 (7th
Cir 2008).
112 274 F Supp 2d 1041 (ED Wisc 2003).
113 id at 1044-45.
114 Id at 1046.
115 Although formal complaint mechanisms are beneficial in that they expressly place the
employer on notice of the unlawful conduct, courts have allowed employees to follow more
informal processes.
2010] 539
The University of Chicago Law Review
when making the complaint."' The fact that the employee does not
have to use specific words, though, does not mean that the employee is
not required to explain the basis for her complaint. Instead, it simply
means that when she provides her explanation, she does not have to
use the language explicitly included within Title VII.
Further, requiring the employee to explain the basis for her ob-
jection to the sexual advances directly aligns with the purposes of Title
VII:" the employee is protected so long as she is objecting to conduct
that Title VII prohibits. Unless she indicates to her supervisor that her
reason for the rejection is the unlawful nature of the advances, the
employer would not be aware that the employee believes she is the
object of discrimination, as opposed to some other non-Title VII justi-
fication for the rejection."' And without this notice, the employer
would be unable to correct the unlawful behavior or otherwise rectify
the workplace discrimination.
B. Two Circumstances under which an Employee Can Reject a
Supervisor's Sexual Advances
In addition to considering the factors outlined in Part III.A, this
Comment argues that courts should also distinguish between quid pro
quo and hostile work environment harassment when evaluating an
opposition clause claim. Courts deciding cases involving an em-
ployee's rejection of her supervisor's sexual advances typically confront
two distinct fact patterns that raise the question of protected activity:
(1) the supervisor's sexual advance is an isolated event and the em-
ployee's rejection is an express rejection; and (2) the supervisor ha-
rasses the employee on multiple occasions before explicitly making a
sexual advance that the employee expressly rejects."' Each of the cases
discussed in Part II involved one of these two situations. The courts ad-
dressing this issue, however, have analyzed these two scenarios similarly,
116 However, this "magic word" exception does not excuse the employee from explaining
her reasons for the objection. See Gates, 513 F3d at 687.
117 See Halfacre v Home Depot, 221 Fed Appx 424,432 (6th Cir 2007) ("The purpose of Title
VII's anti-retaliation provisions is to prohibit 'employer actions that are likely to deter victims of
discrimination from complaining to the EEOC, the courts, and their employers,' and'normally petty
slights, minor annoyances, and simple lack of good manners will not create such deterrence."'),
quoting Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co v White, 548 US 53,54 (2006).
118 See Gates, 513 F3d at 687 ("Although an employee can honestly believe she is the object
of discrimination,... if she never mentions it, a claim of retaliation is not implicated, for an em-
ployer cannot retaliate when it is unaware of any complaints.") (quotation marks omitted).
119 It is also possible that the employee explicitly rejects the supervisor's advances, explain-
ing that the conduct is unlawful under Title VII. This indisputably would fall under the opposi-
tion clause and thus is not at issue in this Comment.
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without acknowledging the legal implications of these factual differenc-
es. The problem with grouping both fact patterns together is that
courts then apply one analysis to determine whether discrimination
occurred generally, without examining the distinct statutory elements
for quid pro quo and hostile work environment harassment.
The first fact pattern, in which the employee rejects a supervisor's
isolated sexual advance, is illustrated by Jordan v Clark.'" The em-
ployee, Evelyn Jordan, alleged that during a lunch meeting, her male
supervisor suggested that she engage in sexual relations with him to
keep her job. Jordan refused the advances, which resulted in her con-
structive termination.'2 The district court found that no other incidents
occurred between Jordan and her supervisor during the course of her
employment.
The second fact pattern, in which the supervisor repeatedly ha-
rasses the employee before the employee refuses his sexual advances,
is illustrated by the Eighth Circuit's decision in Ogden.'" The em-
ployee, Kerry Ogden, alleged that her supervisor made unwelcomed
advances on multiple occasions over a one-year period, including
grabbing Ogden by the waist and asking her to go to his motel room,
placing his arm around her on two occasions in front of coworkers,
asking her to go for drinks after work, asking her to stay with him at
his house, and inviting her to his motel room during a convention, all
of which Ogden refused.'2 This behavior culminated in the supervisor
asking Ogden to accompany him on a "three-day gambling spree,"
which she ultimately refused." Shortly thereafter, her supervisor re-
fused to conduct her raise evaluation, and Ogden subsequently left
her position without the raise.127
Without distinguishing between the single, isolated rejection and
the multi-incident rejection, courts are unable to properly consider the
timeline of events to determine whether each element of the underly-
120 847 F2d 1368 (9th Cir 1988). This fact pattern is also illustrated by Rashid v Beth Israel
Medical Center, 1998 WL 689931, *1 (SDNY) (indicating that, on one occasion, Rashid's supervi-
sor "lured her into a conference room" and sexually assaulted her, which Rashid resisted).
121 Clark, 847 F2d at 1371.
122 Id at 1376-77.
123 See id at 1375.
124 See Part II.B for a complete discussion of Ogden. This fact pattern is also illustrated by
Estes v Illinois Department of Human Services, 2007 WL 551554, *1 (ND Ill) (explaining that the
supervisor asked Estes to engage in a consensual relationship, called Estes her "boy toy," and
asked Estes to engage in sexual relations during a business trip).
125 Ogden, 214 F3d at 1003.
126 Id at 1004.
127 Id.
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ing discrimination claim and the subsequent retaliation claim is met in
the requisite order.'2 As explained in Part I.B, an employee's retalia-
tion claim necessarily includes an underlying discrimination claim-
quid pro quo harassment if the employer's unlawful conduct led to an
adverse action, or hostile work environment harassment if the unlaw-
ful conduct was severe and pervasive-as the first step in a retaliation
claim.'29The employee must establish this first element (or at least that
she had a reasonable belief that she was opposing discrimination) be-
fore moving to the second and third elements: the protected activity
and the adverse action resulting from the protected activity. Because
the discrimination and retaliation elements are complex and courts
often have a difficult time distinguishing between the necessary ele-
ments, courts should differentiate between these two factual circums-
tances to properly determine the merits of the retaliation claim.
The failure of courts to distinguish between these two factual
scenarios has caused multiple courts to erroneously determine that an
employee engaged in protected activity when rejecting a supervisor's
single sexual advance.'" For example, in Farrell v Planters Lifesavers
Co," the court held that the employee, Susan Farrell, engaged in pro-
tected activity when she rebuffed her supervisor's single attempt to
place his hand on her leg and discuss his wife's jealousy of Farrell.'32
The court explained that because sexual harassment is a form of sex
discrimination, "rejecting sexual advances itself must comprise pro-
tected activity for which employees should be protected for oppos-
ing."' The court, though, did not explain whether Farrell's rejection
constituted a single rejection or whether the rejection was in response
to a pattern of discriminatory conduct; instead, the court simply con-
cluded that the supervisor's actions constituted "discrimination."
128 For example, courts should consider whether the alleged discrimination and retaliation
were separated by an adverse employment action (as this would help determine whether a quid
pro quo harassment claim could prevail). See note 21 and accompanying text for a further dis-
cussion of the sequence of retaliation claims based on quid pro quo harassment.
129 See notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
10 See, for example, Little v NBC, 210 F Supp 2d 330, 386 (SDNY 2002); Farrell v Planters
Lifesavers Co, 22 F Supp 2d 372,392 (D NJ 1998), affd in part, revd in part on other grounds, 206
F3d 271,279 n 4 (3d Cir 2000).
131 22 F Supp 2d 372 (D NJ 1998), affd in part, revd in part on other grounds, 206 F3d 271,
279 n 4 (3d Cir 2000).
132 22 F Supp 2d at 381 (explaining that "Farrell responded [to her supervisor's inquiry of
whether her husband gets jealous] by firmly stating 'no, I don't give him a reason to and I suggest
you do the same'").
133 Id at 392.
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But had the court acknowledged that the rejection was a single,
express rejection and examined the applicable quid pro quo harassment
requirements," it would have instead determined that Farrell did not
engage in protected activity. Although Farrell could establish that her
supervisor propositioned her, this act did not lead to an adverse action
before Farrell objected to his behavior. Thus, Farrell could not have had
a reasonable belief that she was "opposing" behavior that constituted
discrimination,' as her supervisor's actions did not meet the statutory
requirements of discrimination. And without an underlying claim of
quid pro quo discrimination-the first event needed for the retaliation
claim -Farrell could not have engaged in protected activity.
As demonstrated in Farrell, by treating the sexual advance as
general discrimination without parsing out the distinct elements of
quid pro quo and hostile work environment harassment, courts have
failed to adequately determine the merits of the discrimination claim
before moving to the retaliation claim. In practical terms, this means
that courts have reached incorrect results about protected activity by
failing to consider whether a plausible discrimination claim existed
prior to the opposition. Thus, although analyzing these fact patterns
separately would often lead to the same result (of finding no pro-
tected activity), this approach allows for better reasoned opinions and
ensures that courts reach correct conclusions in all cases.
C. Application of Protected Activity Standard: The Express Rejec-
tion of Sexual Advances Should Not Be Considered Protected
Activity
This Part proposes a framework for courts to determine whether
an employee has engaged in protected activity. First, courts should
choose to analyze the case as quid pro quo or hostile work environ-
ment harassment, depending on whether there is an express rejection
of a single sexual advance or an express rejection following a pattern
of multiple sexual advances. Second, courts should apply the protected
activity requirements detailed in Part III.A -that the employee must
have a reasonable belief a Title VII violation has occurred and that
the employee must provide the reasons for the express rejection. Ap-
plying this framework, this Part shows that both the single rejection
134 Quid pro quo harassment applies to the single rejection of a sexual advance, as a single
event does not meet the "severe and pervasive" requirement needed for hostile work environ-
ment harassment. For a further explanation of why hostile work environment harassment does
not apply to the single, express rejection, see Part III.C.1.
135 For a discussion of the reasonable belief requirement, see Part III.A.1.
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and multi-incident rejection result in a finding of no retaliation when
the employee only uses an express rejection.
1. The single, express rejection of sexual advances does not con-
stitute protected activity.
An employee does not engage in protected activity by expressly
rejecting a single sexual advance because a reasonable person could
not objectively believe that a single sexual advance constitutes Title VII
discrimination. As explained in Part III.A.1, to establish a reasonable
belief of discrimination, the employee must show that she had both a
subjective and objectively reasonable belief that the supervisor's con-
duct violated Title VII." The first element, the subjective component,
should not be difficult for employees to prove unless there is specific
evidence suggesting that the employee's belief was not sincere.
However, in the case of a single sexual advance, the employee
would not be able to establish the second element-the objective
component-because she would not be able to prove that a reasona-
ble person would believe that her employer has violated any provision
of Title VII. More specifically, an employee making an isolated rejec-
tion would not be able to establish that the employer's conduct consti-
tuted hostile work environment harassment because one incident does
not create a severe or pervasive working environment. Courts have
found that one racial slur or one unwelcome sexual advance does not
constitute discrimination or support a reasonable belief of discrimina-
tion,' suggesting that a single sexual advance would not reasonably
constitute hostile work environment harassment. Additionally, without
evidence of a supervisor's comprehensive plan to continue similar
advances, the employee could not rely on future contingencies to es-
tablish an objectively reasonable belief.'
Similarly, the employee would not be able to establish an objec-
tively reasonable belief that the supervisor's sexual advance consti-
tuted quid pro quo harassment, as the sexual advance would not meet
the requirements of a quid pro quo claim.' As discussed in Part I.A,
136 See notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
137 See, for example, Alternative Resources Corp, 458 F3d at 339-41; LeGrand, 394 F3d at
1101-02 (noting that "[m]ore than a few isolated incidents are required" to establish a hostile
work environment), quoting Tuggle v Mangan, 348 F3d 714,720 (8th Cir 2003). But see Coe, 589
F Supp 2d at 1104-05 (suggesting that "a single incident may be sufficiently 'severe' to support [a
hostile work environment] claim or for a person to reasonably believe that she had been sub-
jected to such harassment" without deciding the issue).
138 See note 86 and accompanying text.
139 See note 21 and accompanying text.
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the elements of quid pro quo harassment include: (1) that the supervi-
sor tried to elicit sexual favors from the employee; and (2) that the
employee experienced some changed term or condition of employ-
ment (an adverse employment action) following the harassment.
When rejecting a supervisor's single sexual advance, the employee
could establish the first element of a quid pro quo claim but would not
be able to establish the second. At the time of the rejection, the em-
ployee has not yet experienced an adverse employment action. Al-
though the employee presumably experiences an adverse action fol-
lowing the refusal, the adverse action would have to occur before the
rejection in order to support an objectively reasonable belief of quid
pro quo harassment. Because the elements of the claim have not been
met when there is no adverse action preceding the rejection, the em-
ployee could not satisfy the reasonable belief requirement.
Accordingly, courts addressing cases involving the single, express
rejection of sexual advances should find that the employee's rejection
does not constitute protected activity because the employee does not
have an objectively reasonable belief that her supervisor's conduct
amounted to either hostile work environment or quid pro quo ha-
rassment under Title VII.m It is thus unnecessary for these courts to
examine whether the employee effectively spoke out against an un-
lawful employment practice, as the rejection could not constitute pro-
tected activity. As discussed above in Part III.B, though, at least one
court-the District of New Jersey in Farrell- erroneously determined
that an employee engaged in protected activity when she merely re-
jected a single sexual advance; under the framework proposed in this
Comment, the employee would not have recovered under the antire-
taliation provision for her single, express rejection.
2. The multi-incident express rejection of sexual advances does
not constitute protected activity.
Like the single express rejection of sexual advances, the em-
ployee's express rejection of a supervisor's sexual advances that fol-
lows other harassing behavior, or a multi-incident rejection, does not
140 This conclusion does not limit the protections afforded by Title VII. If no adverse action
followed the express rejection, then neither the antiretaliation provision nor the antidiscrimina-
tion provision provides a remedy for the employee. The conclusion in this Comment simply
reiterates that no remedy is available under the antiretaliation provision. If an adverse action did
follow the express rejection, then Title VII provides a remedy for the employee through its pro-
hibition of quid pro quo harassment. The conclusion in this Comment merely denies an addi-
tional remedy under the antiretaliation provision.
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constitute protected activity. Unlike the single rejection, though, the
express rejection of multiple advances could satisfy the reasonable
belief requirement. However, the express rejection still would not
qualify as protected activity because the employee has not spoken out
against a practice that violates Title VII.
Under this factual scenario, the employee might be able to satisfy
the objective component of the reasonable belief requirement. As
discussed in Part I.B.1, the employee need not establish an adverse
employment action for a hostile work environment claim but must
establish that the harassment was "sufficiently severe or pervasive" to
alter the workplace conditions. The employee does not have to prove
that the supervisor's actions actually amounted to an actionable dis-
crimination claim; she need only establish that she had a reasonable
belief that they constituted discrimination. So long as the harassing acts
created a pattern of discrimination, courts are likely to find that the
employee had an objectively reasonable belief that the conduct consti-
tuted hostile work environment harassment.'' Accordingly, when faced
with more than a single sexual advance, courts could hold that the ob-
jectively reasonable belief element has been satisfied.
An employee's express rejection of a supervisor's multi-incident
sexual advance would fail, though, under the "speaking out" require-
ment. As explained in Part III.A.2, to prevail on a retaliation claim,
the employee must indicate that she is objecting to an unlawful em-
ployment practice because this practice violates Title VII. When an
employee simply rejects her supervisor's sexual advances, she does not
put her employer on notice that she believes her supervisor's actions
to be unlawful under Title VII. Because of the express nature of the
refusal, the employee does not indicate whether her rejection is to the
alleged discrimination or whether she is objecting to behavior that she
considers generally "offensive."42 This is problematic because Title VII
requires that the employee oppose an unlawful employment practice
and, here, the employee does not indicate that this practice is the basis
for her complaint. Further, without providing her employer with ade-
quate notice of the unlawful conduct, the employee has not given the
141 See, for example, Paul v Northrop Grumman Ship Systems, 309 Fed Appx 825,828 (5th Cir
2009) (noting that chronic and frequent cases of non-consensual physical touching would be action-
able under Title VII); Ejikeme v Violet, 307 Fed Appx 944,949 (6th Cir 2009), citing Harris v Forklift
Systems Inc, 510 US 17, 23 (1993) (considering "the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its
severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and
whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance" in evaluating a hostile
work environment claim).
142 See Coe, 589 F Supp 2d at 1105.
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employer the opportunity to correct the behavior. Thus, the em-
ployee cannot be afforded antiretaliation protection without explain-
ing the reasons for her complaint.
Many courts that have addressed this factual situation, however,
have erroneously determined that the employee did engage in pro-
tected activity when rejecting a supervisor's repeated advances. For
example, in Ogden, the Eighth Circuit found that the employee en-
gaged in protected activity when she asked her supervisor to stop
making sexual advances towards her." Had the court employed the
framework introduced by this Comment, though, it would have de-
termined that her statements did not constitute opposition conduct.
Although Ogden could have had a reasonable belief that her supervi-
sor's repeated conduct constituted hostile work environment harass-
ment-as he propositioned her on multiple occasions-simply asking
him to "stop" his conduct did not satisfy the "speaking out" require-
ment. A court reviewing her statement would have had no indication
whether Ogden wanted her employer to "stop" because of personal
reasons or because she considered his conduct to violate Title VII.
Thus, the Eighth Circuit's decision would not stand under the frame-
work proposed in this Comment.
D. When Should a Court Find That an Employee Engaged in Pro-
tected Activity by Rejecting a Sexual Advance?
Although an employee does not engage in protected activity
when expressly rejecting a supervisor's sexual advance, it does not fol-
low that the employee is never protected by Title VII. The cases ex-
plored in this Comment have only involved instances in which the
employee simply states "no" or only provides a personal reason for
her refusal, which means that the employee does not meet the reason-
ableness or "speaking out" requirements. This Comment does not ad-
dress those instances in which the employee provides a more explicit
explanation for why she is refusing the sexual advance. This Part ex-
plains when a court could determine that an employee engaged in
protected activity and when a court, instead, should apply the antidi-
scrimination provision to afford the employee Title VII protection.
As discussed in Part III.C.1, in the first factual circumstance-
where an employee rejects a supervisor's single sexual advance and
143 The Supreme Court in Crawford suggested that notice was an important function of the
employee's opposition conduct. See text accompanying note 35.
144 For a discussion of Ogden, see Part II.B.
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subsequently suffers an adverse employment action-the employee
should not be protected by the antiretaliation provision. Instead, the
employee receives antidiscrimination protection under the quid pro
quo rationale.
In the second factual circumstance, where the supervisor's sexual
advance is preceded by a pattern of discrimination, the employee
could be protected by both-or some combination of-the antidiscri-
mination and antiretaliation provisions by indicating that she is speak-
ing out against her supervisor's discriminatory conduct. In this situa-
tion, the employee has already established the reasonable belief re-
quirement: the pattern of discrimination shows that she had a reason-
able belief that her supervisor's actions constituted hostile work envi-
ronment harassment."' And by explaining the reasons for her opposi-
tion, she could also establish the "speaking out" requirement.
Although Title VII does not provide an exhaustive list of what an
employee must state to engage in protected activity, it is possible to
provide a few hypothetical examples of what a court could reasonably
interpret to constitute "speaking out" against an unlawful employment
practice. Whereas the employee need not rely on specific "magic words"
when opposing an unlawful employment practice, as discussed in Part
III.A.2, a court could look for an indication that the employee's rejec-
tion is based on the unlawful nature of the supervisor's conduct or a
recognition that the advance is not part of the usual employee-
employer relationship."6 For example, the court could find the following
statements to constitute "speaking out": "No, this is inappropriate. Our
work relationship does not include a sexual relationship"; "No. You are
my boss and it is not right for me to engage in sexual relations with my
boss"; or "No. It is not legal for you to ask me to take part in sexual re-
lations." These explanations would indicate to the supervisor that the
employee is rejecting an advance that is inappropriate in light of their
work relationship and because a supervisor cannot proposition an em-
ployee under Title VII. These explanations also do not include any
"magic words," such as "gender discrimination," which might place too
145 See Part II.C.2.
146 Because the majority of employers now provide all employees with a baseline of sexual
harassment training, the "speaking out" requirement does not create too high a burden for the
employee opposing the practice. See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Questions &
Answers for Small Employers on Employer Liability for Harassment by Supervisors, online at
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/harassment-facts.html (visited Oct 24, 2009) ("Employers
should establish, distribute to all employees, and enforce a policy prohibiting harassment and
setting out a procedure for making complaints.").
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high of a burden on the employee opposing the advance.", They do,
however, provide significantly more information than the reasons ex-
plored earlier in this Comment that should not result in protected activ-
ity, such as "No, I'm 'tired of this shit,' and make clear that the em-
ployee is not basing her rejection on personal reasons.
As this discussion illustrates, the reasonableness and "speaking
out" requirements do not prevent an employee from obtaining
Title VII protection when rejecting a supervisor's sexual advance. In-
stead, the employee maintains the ability to claim protection under
the antidiscrimination provision and could potentially succeed under
the antiretaliation provision in a number of limited circumstances.
CONCLUSION
Over the past few decades, the circuit courts have been struggling
to determine what conduct is protected activity under the antiretalia-
tion provision. Although the circuit courts generally have come to a
consensus about most forms of protected activity, the courts are split
on whether refusing a supervisor's sexual advances can be protected
by Title VII's antiretaliation provision. Courts reaching the Eighth
Circuit's conclusion-that this conduct is protected-have expressed
valid concerns, including that Title VII should be read broadly to afford
the greatest protection possible for employees to prevent workplace
discrimination; courts reaching the Fifth Circuit's conclusion also have
expressed significant concerns about over-extending the antiretaliation
provision to cover conduct that should be protected instead by the anti-
discrimination provision. Nevertheless, the appropriate solution is not
to afford protection under the antiretaliation provision every time an
employee rejects a supervisor's advances. Instead, courts should diffe-
rentiate between an employer's single express rejection of sexual ad-
vances and a rejection that follows multiple advances in order to ex-
amine whether the employee reasonably believed that her supervisor's
advances constituted discrimination and whether the employee spoke
out against an unlawful employment practice.
147 Of course, if the employee did use such magic words, she would also engage in
protected activity.
148 See Wagner v Burnham, 2006 WL 266551, *3 (NDNY). Other examples of statements
that do not constitute protected activity include "No, I'm 'not messing with [you] anymore' be-
cause I 'just want[] to keep the slate clean between me and my wife,"' Tate, 546 F3d at 530, 532,
and "[No, I don't give [my husband] a reason to [be jealous] and I suggest you do the same,"
Farrell, 22 F Supp 2d at 381.
2010]1 549
550 The University of Chicago Law Review [77:521
It does not follow, however, that an employee would not be pro-
tected when rejecting a supervisor's advances. As Part III.D explains,
the employee simply must state the reasons for her refusal when re-
jecting a supervisor's sexual advances in order to engage in protected
activity. Additionally, the employee still has the opportunity to file a
discrimination claim in most circumstances in response to the advance,
under the hostile work environment and quid pro quo harassment
rationales. Thus, this Comment does not seek to remove protections
against workplace discrimination; rather the solution aims to assess
the different forms of discrimination under the appropriate provisions
of Title VII and encourage courts to afford protection under the anti-
retaliation provision only when appropriate.
